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Legal Profession 
by William J. Riegger* 
During 1967, the California courts made decisions dealing 
with admission to the bar, discipline, the statute of limitations 
in legal malpractice, and just compensation. The legislature 
also affected the legal profession by expanding the power of 
local government to employ private counsel, 1 by changing the 
rules governing admission of out-of-state attorneys to the bar,2 
and by changing certain fee provisions.s 
* B.S.L. 1948, J.D. 1950, University 
of Minnesota. Professor and Assistant 
Dean, University of San Francisco 
School of Law. Member, Arizona and 
Minnesota State Bars. 
The author extends his appreciation 
to Miss Sandra Wruck, second year 
student at Golden Gate College, School 
of Law, for assistance in the prepara-
tion of this article. 
1. See Cal. Water Code § 71758; Cal. 
Ed. Code § 1016.5. 
2. § 6062 of the Cal. Bus. & Prof. 
Code was amended to add the provision 
that an applicant "may demonstrate to 
the satisfaction of the examining com-
mittee that his experience and qualifi-
cations qualify him to take an examina-
tion." This allows applicants an alter-
native to the previous requirement of 
spending four of the previous six years 
in the practice of law in another state. 
3. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 284. 
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The California Supreme Court decided several important 
bar admission cases. In Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Exam-
iners4 and March v. Committee of Bar Examiners,5 the Com-
mittee of Bar Examiners made value judgments and, in effect, 
by refusing certification, attempted to punish past conduct 
of the applicants. 
In Hallinan the committee refused to certify petitioner who 
had graduated from an accredited California law school and 
had passed the California Bar examination. The committee 
found petitioner did not possess the good moral character 
necessary for admission, since he had been convicted of such 
misdemeanors as unlawful assembly, trespass to obstruct law-
ful business, and unlawful entry, all in connection with civil 
disobedience. Also noted and discussed by the court was the 
petitioner's proclivity for settling disputes with fisticuffs. The 
court noted that out of nine incidents, six were "youthful in-
discretions," and that the three most recent fights were satis-
factorily explained. 
The court indicated that the state bar did not have a right 
to judge an applicant's philosophy. Hallinan had told the 
commission that he advocated extralegal means (such as 
peaceful sit-ins) to achieve a desired end if, and only if, all 
legal means had been unsuccessfully exhausted. The court 
held that if it were to deny the right to enter a licensed profes-
sion to every person who had engaged in a sit-in or other form 
of non-violent civil disobedience, it would deprive the commu-
nity of the services of many highly qualified persons of the 
highest moral courage. It further held that the committee 
could not consider past actions of an applicant unless those 
actions had a direct bearing on the applicant's moral qualifi-
cations to practice law. The court found that Hallinan's acts 
were not necessarily incompatible with the truthfulness, faith-
fulness, and integrity required to practice law. The issue as 
stated by the court was not whether the petitioner's conduct 
should be condoned, but whether the conduct exhibited should 
deny him admission to practice. Based upon this reasoning, 
4. 65 CaI.2d 447, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228, 5. 67 Cal.2d 731, 63 Cal. Rptr. 399, 
421 P.2d 76 (1966). 433 P.2d 191 (1967). 
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the court held that Hallinan should be admitted to the Cali-
fornia Bar, thereby reversing the action of the committee. 
In reaching its conclusion the court blurred a distinction 
that it had previously made between application for admission 
and disciplinary proceedings. In the case of In re Wells,6 
it had been held that the court could refuse admission even 
if the proof of conduct found would not be sufficient cause 
for disbarment. In Hallinan, although the court admitted 
that there may be some distinctions between refusal of admis-
sion and disbarment, it held that "insofar as the scope of 
inquiry is concerned, the distinction between admission and 
disciplinary proceedings is today more apparent than rea1.m 
The court further stated that in admission proceedings, as 
in disciplinary proceedings, the court must examine and 
weigh the evidence, and pass upon its sufficiency, resolving 
any reasonable doubts in favor of the accused. The court 
stated that: 
Fundamentally, the question involved in both situations 
is the same-is the applicant for admission or the attor-
ney sought to be disciplined a fit and proper person to 
be permitted to practice law, and that usually turns upon 
whether he has committed or is likely to continue to 
commit acts of moral turpitude. At the time of oral 
argument the attorney for respondent frankly conceded 
that the test for admission and for discipline is and should 
be the same. We agree with this concession.s 
In March, the California Supreme Court also reversed the 
committee's refusal to certify the petitioner. The petitioner 
had testified falsely under oath before the Dies Committee, 
the former House Committee on Un-American Activities. 
Subsequently, he had made numerous false statements, not 
under oath, to a union trial committee, and in a later appeal, 
to executives of the union. The Committee of Bar Examiners 
made clear that March not only had committed these acts, 
but also had not mentioned them either on his registration 
6. 174 Cal. 467, 163 P. 657 (1917). 8. 65 Cal.2d at 453, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 
7. 65 Cal.2d at 452, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 233, 421 P.2d at 81. 
233, 421 P.2d at 81. 
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form as a law student or on his application for examination 
and admission to practice law. Petitioner March admitted 
the false testimony, but said that his attendance at law school 
had effected a change in his outlook. In dealing with the 
allegation of omissions in the registration forms, the court 
noted that the petitioner had stated therein that he was a 
former member of the Young Communist League and the 
Communist Party, that he had been summoned before the 
Dies Committee in 1939, and that he had been before the 
union on charges of being a communist. 
"While it is true that he did not state unequivocally he 
had made false statements on the occasions in question, 
his answers on the application, when viewed as a whole, 
establish that he was not guilty of deliberate conceal-
ment."9 
The court avoided the basic question of whether petitioner's 
false statements before the Dies Committee and in the union 
proceedings should justify the conclusion that he was not a 
fit person to practice law. It determined that since petitioner 
had convincingly demonstrated his rehabilitation, it was not 
necessary to decide whether the prior acts constituted moral 
turpitude. As in Hallinan, the court stressed the great weight 
to be given to recommendations written on petitioner's behalf 
by an unusually large number of attorneys. As was stated in 
Hallinan "[T]he law looks with favor upon rewarding, with 
the opportunity to serve, one who had achieved 'reformation 
and regeneration.' mo 
A third situation involving admission to practice law was 
adjudicated in Chaney v. State Bar.n This case dealt with 
a rather unique test of the committee's power. An applicant 
for admission to the bar had twice failed the examination 
and then brought suit in the United States District Court 
under the Civil Rights Act of 1871,12 seeking an injunction 
and damages for lack of certification. Chaney named the 
9. 67 Cal.2d at 743, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 
407, 433 P.2d at 199. 
10. 65 Cal.2d at 462, 55 Cal. Rptr. 
at 239, 421 P.2d at 87. 
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state bar, members of its Board of Governors, and members 
of its Committee of Bar Examiners as defendants. Appellant 
contended that the essay type of examination was fundamen-
tally unfair and that it was used "to control competition" 
since only about one-half of those taking the examination 
passed. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the trial court's dismissal. Because the failure to pass an essay 
type of examination was not a deprivation of rights, privileges, 
or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States, the applicant had no cause of action under the 
Civil Rights Act of 1871. 
The court indicated that California had a right to require 
high standards of qualification for admission to its bar, so 
long as the standards were equal and fair. The court further 
held that, under California law, the Committee of Bar Exam-
iners merely acts as an instrumentality of the California Su-
preme Court for the purpose of assisting in matters of admis-
sion, and that only the California Supreme Court has author-
ity to permit an applicant to practice law. The court reiter-
ated that it would look into any situation where an applicant 
could show that the committee had failed him on the bar 
examination because of fraud, imposition, or coercion. How-
ever, since no appeal along these lines had been made through 
the state courts, the matter was not ripe for federal action. 
We turn next to traditional concepts of disciplinary pro-
ceedings: contempt and disbarment. In Miller v. Municipal 
Court/3 the court of appeal reversed a contempt conviction. 
It held that a deputy public defender was not in direct con-
tempt for failing to appear in the courtroom at a designated 
time as a consultant to a defendant, who was appearing in 
propria persona. The deputy's delay had not left the defend-
ant in court without a legal adviser, since another deputy 
public defender was present. The deputy against whom the 
contempt proceedings were brought had been delayed because, 
at the public defender's request, he had been attending to 
other matters connected with the defendant's case. Care had 
13. 249 Cal. App.2d 531, 57 Cal. 
Rptr. 578 (1967). 
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been taken to notify the judge that the deputy would be late. 
The court distinguished this case from Lyons v. Superior 
Court14 and Arthur v. Superior Court/5 where the failure of 
the respective attorneys to appear had made it impossible 
for the trials to continue, and where the court had not been 
advised in either case that the attorney would not be present. 
In Vaughn v. Municipal Court/6 also decided this year, 
counsel was held in contempt both for misrepresentation of 
facts to the court in a successful attempt to obtain a continu-
ance in a criminal trial, and for failing to appear at the ordered 
time of the continuance. Vaughn had informed the court 
that a continuance of his Los Angeles appearance was re-
quired because he had a trial in another city on that day; 
in fact he had no such trial. Vaughn then failed to appear 
on the new date. The court reiterated from Miller that willful 
failure to appear at a trial at the appointed time constitutes 
direct contempt. Regarding the element of misrepresentation, 
the court stated the "conduct denounced . . . is not the 
act of an attorney by which he successfully misleads the court, 
but the presentation of a statement of fact, known by him 
to be false, which tends to do SO.,,17 The court, in rejecting 
the attorney's exception to the failure of the judge to disqualify 
himself, stated that with the commission of a direct contempt, 
the judge in whose presence the contempt is committed has 
the constitutional power to punish the offender summarily, 
since the necessities of the case will require that the affronted 
judge preside. Furthermore, the court, in summarily reject-
ing the attorney's claim that due process was violated by fail-
ure to inform him of his constitutional rights under Escobedd8 
and Dorado/9 stated: 
How can an experienced lawyer, under these circum-
stances, who considered himself well enough qualified 
14. 43 Cal.2d 755, 278 P.2d 681 17. 252 Cal. App.2d at 358, 60 Cal. 
(1955). Rptr. at 581. 
15. 62 Cal.2d 404, 42 Cal. Rptr. 441, 18. Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 
398 P.2d 777 (1965). U.S. 478, 12 L.Ed.2d 977, 84 S.Ct. 1758 
16. 252 Cal. App.2d 348, 60 Cal. (1964). 
Rptr. 575 (1967). 19. People v. Dorado, 62 Cal.2d 338, 
42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361 (1965). 
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to represent literally hundreds of persons charged with 
a variety of serious felonies (murder, burglary, assault 
with a deadly weapon . . .) now, in good faith, make 
the claim that . . . he did not know of his constitu-
tional rights.20 
It was also pointed out that the attorney had had ample 
opportunity to obtain counsel for himself, and that he had 
elected not to do so. 
In the three disciplinary proceedings for misappropriation 
in 1967, the court meted out punishment ranging from suspen-
sion from practice and probation to disbarment. In In re 
Urias, 1 counsel had been convicted of grand larceny. Urias 
was not disbarred, because consideration was given to his 
subsequent rehabilitation from the alcoholism which had 
caused the financial hardship under which he had operated at 
the time of the theft. 
Although extenuating circumstances were taken into con-
sideration in Urias,2 nevertheless, in Simmons v. State Bar3 
the court reiterated that misappropriation of funds entrusted 
to an attorney is a serious breach of professional ethics and 
morality, and is deserving of disbarment in the absence of 
extenuating and mitigating circumstances. Failing to find 
such extenuating or mitigating circumstances in this case, the 
court upheld a two-year suspension recommended by the State 
Bar. 
In Grove v. State Bar,4 two proceedings, one for suspension 
and one for disbarment, were consolidated for hearing. The 
court determined that petitioner should be disbarred, and did 
not consider the suspension. Grove had been charged not 
only with taking money from clients, but with nonperformance 
20. 252 Cal. App.2d at 365-366, 60 
Cal. Rptr. at 586. 
1. 65 Cal.2d 258, 53 Cal. Rptr. 881, 
418 P.2d 849 (1966). 
2. "Prior to 1955 petitioner's convic-
tion of grand theft would have resulted 
in automatic disbarment (Stats. 1939, 
ch. 34, p. 357), and the vast majority of 
grand theft convictions of attorneys 
since that date have resulted in disbar-
ment or resignation with prejudice." 65 
Cal.2d at 262, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 883, n. 5, 
418 P.2d at 851, n. 5 (1966). 
3. 65 Cal.2d 281, 54 Cal. Rptr. 97, 
419 P.2d 161 (1966). 
4. 66 Cal.2d 680, 58 Cal. Rptr. 564, 
427 P.2d 164 (1967). 
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of promised legal action. He had a history of allowing the 
statute of limitations to run, failing to appear in court, and 
failing to return documents and records of various clients. 
In each instance, he had refused to answer letters and tele-
phone calls from clients concerning these matters. The only 
evidence his defense offered in mitigation was a report fur-
nished by a psychiatrist indicating that Grove was neurotic. 
The court held that although one count would not be grounds 
for disbarment, the ten incidents which were before the court 
indicated that his persistent failure to perform services for 
which he had been engaged was willful and deliberate. Al-
though the court appreciated the petitioner's frankness in 
recognizing his problem, it felt obligated to disbar the attorney 
to protect the public, and stated: 
In this area our duty lies in the assurance that the 
public will be protected in the performance of the high 
duties of the attorney rather than in an analysis of the 
reasons for his delinquency. Our primary concern must 
be the fulfillment of proper professional standards, what-
ever the unfortunate cause, emotional or otherwise, for 
the attorney's failure to do SO.5 
Turning to the area of the statute of limitations involving 
actions for legal malpractice, there were two cases decided 
in 1967. In Fazio v. Hayhurst,6 the client, in reliance on 
negligent advice of counsel, had elected to take under her 
husband's will rather than to take her intestate share. The 
attorney also negligently prepared and filed the order settling 
the final account, wherein he listed all of the estate as separate 
property rather than community property. The client thereby 
lost approximately $47,000. The election was signed on 
October 23, 1962, more than two years before the action for 
malpractice was brought. However, the decree of distribution 
was entered within the two-year period prior to the bringing 
of the action. The court held that the client had not irrevo-
cably acted upon the advice of her counsel until the final 
decree of distribution was entered, inasmuch as her right to 
5. 66 Cal.2d at 685, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 6. 247 Cal. App.2d 200, 55 Cal. Rptr. 
567, 427 P.2d at 167. 370 (1966). 
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change her election was preserved until that time. Thus, the 
two-year statute commenced running at the time of the final 
distribution, rather than at the time of the signing of the 
election. 
In Eckert v. Schaal,7 a group of co-adventurers purchased 
property, formed a corporation, and sold the property to 
the corporation at an undisclosed profit. One year and six 
months after the sale had been completed, the clients were 
sued by other shareholders for the undisclosed profits, and 
seven months later the clients cross-complained in that action 
against their attorney for malpractice in having failed to 
advise them that the profits should have been disclosed to the 
corporation at the time of the sale. In sustaining the demurrer 
to the cross-complaint on the grounds that the statute of limi-
tations had run, the court distinguished Fazio, since there 
the election to take under the will could have been revoked 
up until the time of distribution of assets of the estate, whereas 
once the corporate sale in Eckert had been made at an un-
disclosed profit, the action could not be revoked or reversed. 
A number of cases this year dealt with the problem of just 
compensation for attorneys. In Estate of M orinini, 8 the court 
held the granting of attorney's fees to be an abuse of dis-
cretion in the absence of a valid contest for letters of admin-
istration. In this case, decedent owned property in Monterey 
County and his family resided in Switzerland. Prior to filing 
his petition for letters of administration, the Public Admin-
istrator of Monterey County had contacted the surviving wife's 
sister. The sister had approved of his filing the petition, but 
she was subsequently requested by the decedent's wife in 
Switzerland to act as administratrix and consequently filed 
a petition. The public administrator was so notified, but did 
not withdraw his petition. The superior court granted letters 
of administration to the sister and awarded attorney's fees 
to the public administrator. In holding this to be an abuse 
of discretion, the court stated that employing an attorney 
for a petition for letters of administration is a contract made 
7. 251 Cal. App.2d 1, 58 Cal. Rptr. 8. 252 Cal. App.2d 852, 60 Cal. Rptr. 
817 (1967). 813 (1967). 
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in advance of any authority over the estate. Whether the 
application is successful or not, in the absence of special 
circumstances, the estate is not to be charged therefor. 
Spencer v. Taylor9 involved a retaining lien arising from a 
divorce proceeding wherein a trust account had been created 
for the husband and wife by their respective counsel. The 
wife thereafter discharged her attorney and agreed that all 
the money in the trust account belonged to her husband. 
When the husband sought to acquire the money, the wife's 
former attorney refused to release it and claimed a lien there-
on for his fee. At the same time, the attorneys sought to 
recover the fees directly from the wife. The main issue on 
appeal was whether a common-law retaining lien existed. 
While reiterating that a lien on behalf of an attorney for 
fees may be created as a result of a specific agreement there-
for, the court indicated that California law is unclear as to 
whether a retaining lien, in fact, exists in California.1o The 
court went on to say: 
In any event, we do not find it necessary to resolve the 
perplexing question of whether a common-law retaining 
lien exists in this state because respondents 
did not and could not acquire such a lien under the facts 
of this case. 
To hold that an attorney may acquire a retaining lien 
. . . on property which he acquired . . . with the 
duty which he voluntarily assumed as a trustee . 
would be repugnant to the high professional standard 
which the attorney must maintain during all phases of 
litigation. . . .11 
By holding that a common-law retaining lien would not apply 
in this case, the court avoided determining whether such a 
lien exists in California. 
9. 252 Cal. App.2d 735, 60 Cal. Rptr. 11. 252 Cal. App.2d at 744-745, 60 
747 (1967). Cal. Rptr. at 754. 
10. 252 Cal. App.2d at 744, 60 Cal. 
Rptr. at 754. 
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McCafferty v. Gilbank12 dealt with another aspect of liens 
in California. Here the former wife of the plaintiff in a per-
sonal injury action had obtained a judgment against him for 
back alimony and child support. Their respective attorneys 
had entered into an agreement whereby the ex-wife was to 
receive one-half of the proceeds of the plaintiff's personal in-
jury action in settlement of her judgment. Upon its receipt by 
plaintiff and his attorney, the check was cashed. No funds 
were furnished to the ex-wife. In reversing a non-suit granted 
in an action for conversion against the attorney, the court 
held that it was the attorney's duty to see that plaintiff's 
ex-wife was paid, pursuant to his agreement with her attorney, 
despite the fact that there was no actual lien attached to the 
funds. 
An attorney's duty was discussed in Gold v. Greenwald. 13 
This case dealt with duty to a long-time client who became 
a business partner. Here the attorney sued the client for 
termination of an oral joint venture and for an accounting. 
The court ruled that although the joint venture would have 
been fair between two non-lawyers, there is a presumption 
of undue influence if the attorney does not advise his client 
as if the client were a third party, or advise the client to seek 
independent counsel. The attorney had failed to warn the 
client of the dangers inherent in the joint venture and the 
dangers of dealing with him. The court, in affirming the deci-
sion of the trial court, held that the joint venture was therefore 
unenforceable against the defendant-client. 
The court of appeal also considered the necessity of a 
judge's impartiality. In the judiciary, a conflict of interest 
generally results in the disqualification of the judge.14 In 
Tatum v. Southern Pacific Company,15 the judge disqualified 
himself when he learned that he was trustee of 400 shares 
in the defendant corporation. However, this was not until 
after the liability aspect of the case had been tried. After 
12. 249 Cal. App.2d 569, 57 Cal. 14. The pertinent California statutes 
Rptr. 695 (1967). are §§ 170 and 170a of the Cal. Code 
13. 247 Cal. App.2d 296, 55 Cal. Civ. Proc. 
Rptr. 660 (1966). 15. 250 Cal. App.2d 40, 58 Cal. Rptr. 
238 (1967). 
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verdict for the defendant, plaintiff made a motion for a new 
trial on the grounds of error of law and insufficiency of the 
evidence. On the motion, the lower court vacated the judg-
ment and granted a new trial on the sole ground of dis-
qualification. The appellate court admitted that a judgment 
against defendant would have had no effect on the value of 
the stock; that the judge had not been aware of his holding 
of the stock before he rendered the verdict; and that no error 
had been shown in the trial itself. However, under the terms 
of section 170 of the Code of Civil Procedure, designed to 
encourage faith in the fairness of courts, the disqualification 
of an interested judge is absolute; the statute is inflexible and 
leaves the judge with no jurisdiction to proceed, regardless 
of the degree of such interest. I6 Counsel for defendant queried 
whether, if such a judgment is absolutely void and no statute 
of limitations applies, the discovery of interest many years 
after judgment might not cause serious problems. The court 
avoided this argument by pointing out that it is based on 
mere possibility and is inapplicable here. The case points 
out that any act of a disqualified judge in violation of section 
170 of the Code of Civil ProcedureI7 is absolutely void wher-
ever brought in question; that consent of the parties cannot 
impart validity to the proceedings; and that a party to the 
action is not estopped from attacking it by the fact that 
he attended the trial without raising the objection. Therefore 
it is well established that, under the California rules, owner-
ship by the judge of a single share of stock of a corporate 
party to the litigation disqualifies the judge from proceeding 
in the action.18 
Major developments in the matter of professional responsi-
bility have been created outside the courts and the legislature, 
at least in California, in the past year. The American Bar 
16. Lindsay-Strathmore Irr. Dist. v. 
Superior Court, 182 Cal. 315, 187 P. 
1056 (1920)_ 
17. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 170(2) 
states that "No justice or judge shall sit 
or act as such in any action or proceed-
ing . . . in which he is interested as 
a holder or owner of any capital stock 
424 CAL LAW 1967 
of a corporation, or of any bond, note 
or other security issued by a corpora-
tion; ... " 
18. This is not so on the federal side, 
as illustrated by the case of Lampert v. 
HolIis Music, 105 F. Supp. 3 (E.D. N.Y. 
[1952]). 
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Association and the California Bar Association are giving 
a hard look at the canons of ethics and rules of professional 
conduct, with an eye towards specialization. The United 
Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Association19 case has brought 
the question of group legal services before the bar and the 
public once more. The neighborhood legal centers, whatever 
their sponsorship, have raised questions such as who shall 
control these centers and who shall decide what cases are to 
be taken. The centers have been remarkably active in the 
past year. Many of the cases handled by these centers have 
brought a new emphasis to the legal profession in the fields 
of debtor remedies, landlord-tenant, welfare, and uninsured 
motorist. Out of this may come an entirely new area of 
instruction in the subject of poverty law, both in the law 
schools20 and by the Continuing Education of the Bar of Cali-
fornia. It has been proposed that a group of lawyers work-
ing for the Office of Economic Opportunity legal service cen-
ters be formed into a separate staff of research attorneys whose 
primary function would be to further law reform and social 
change, with the neighborhood centers instructed to keep an 
eye out for certain fact situations involving clients who come 
to the centers.l 
To end on a pleasant note, a recent article in the Wall 
Street Journal stated that a certain New York law firm was 
prepared to offer $15,000 per year to attorneys who have just 
passed the bar. It would seem that one reason for the neces-
sity of paying this unusually high stipend to new lawyers is 
the scarcity to established law firms of available recruits 
created by the number of lawyers choosing to enter such legal 
aid programs as those just discussed. 
19. 389 U.S. 217, 19 L.Ed.2d 426, 88 1. CEB Legal Ser. Gazette, Vol. II, 
S.Ct. 353 (1967). No.3, p. 61. 
20. CEB Legal Ser. Gazette, Vol. I, 
No. 11, p. 135. 
• 
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